The cash machine. Growing faster each quarter for a year, and funds everything else.
Eternal Limited · quarter ended 30 June 2026
Both figures are the company's own. The gap is an accounting change, not a boom. Customer spending the cleanest measure of size grew 54%. Here is the quarter in plain English, in about five minutes.
SOURCE Shareholders' letter & unaudited results, Q1FY27 · reviewed by Deloitte Haskins & SellsWhat people actually paid across all apps.
Tripled mostly on paper. Like-for-like it grew 66%.
All four businesses moved the right way.
Fell because of tax, not because of trading.
01 the quarter
Eternal owns Zomato (food delivery), Blinkit (10-minute grocery), District (dining & tickets) and Hyperpure (restaurant supplies). Every one grew and every one improved its margin.
Someone else owned the biscuits. Blinkit took a commission for listing and delivering them, and only that commission counted as revenue.
Blinkit now buys the biscuits itself. So the whole ₹100 lands in revenue. Same customer, same profit much bigger revenue number.
Strip this out and growth was 66%. The same shift is why Hyperpure looks down 55% its goods now sit inside Blinkit's books. Underneath, Hyperpure grew 27%.
Two years ago food delivery was the whole story. Today groceries are the majority of what customers spend and the source of almost all the growth.
The cash machine. Growing faster each quarter for a year, and funds everything else.
Profitable three quarters running while opening two stores a day.
Still losing money, but growing twice as fast as management promised.
Small, but making money for the first time.
Grocery (middle band) is doing all the heavy lifting. Total spending is up 54% in a year.
Up three times in a year and that is after absorbing ₹94 cr of losses on new bets (Bistro, Nugget), up from ₹64 cr last quarter.
From a ₹162 cr loss to a ₹102 cr profit in four quarters.
02 what changes for Eternal
Eternal used to be an app that took a cut. It now owns stock, operates 19 million square feet of stores and warehouses, and spends more on building than it earns. That is the real story of the quarter.
Building cost more than the entire operating profit. Cash still went up only because ₹18,288 cr sitting in the bank earns ₹311 cr a quarter in interest.
Each store costs ₹2.5 crore to build and should sell ₹40 crore a year. That works out to about 9.6 paise of capital for every rupee of sales and 4 paise of profit. A 42% return would be excellent.
The catch: stores today sell ₹8.27 lakh a day, not the ₹11 lakh the maths assumes. Three-quarters of the way there. And stores now cost 2.5× what management guided a year ago.
Customers who stay spend nearly 3× more by year three.Blinkit cohort spending · quarter 12 = 279% of quarter 1
Nearly half of customers are still ordering three years later. Those who stay buy far more.
Old losses that sheltered Eternal from tax have run out. Trading actually improved the taxman just arrived.
03 who else should care
At this quarter's pace Blinkit alone annualises to roughly ₹68,500 crore a shop that did not exist five years ago. (Management called Q1 seasonally strong, so treat that as a pace, not a promise.)
Blinkit is profitable three quarters running while still opening 200 stores a quarter. Every competitor now has to explain its own losses.
−₹162 cr → +₹102 cr in a year31.8 million buyers a month, average basket ₹518, and premium "gourmet" stores coming to the big eight cities. Different pack sizes, different margins, one powerful buyer.
331 mn orders this quarterEach store does ₹8.27 lakh a day about ₹30 crore a year from a plain warehouse with no shop floor and nobody walking in.
2,443 stores · 300+ citiesBlinkit now buys directly instead of earning a commission. Stock on the books went from ₹449 crore to ₹3,060 crore in a year.
Amounts owed to suppliers: ₹4,660 crManagement calls the new low-price entrants a discount story with no new idea. Zomato's own growth sped up for a fifth straight quarter anyway.
Zomato spending +20% · margin 5.6%District covers 5,000+ screens and 7,500+ events, growing 60% a year with an app already on 27 million phones.
District spending ₹3,218 crEternal has proved an Indian internet company can grow fast and make money at the same time. But to get there it has become a retailer with warehouses, stock and leases not a light-touch app. The 42% return that justifies all the building is still a target, not a result.